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ABSTRACT 
RENSKE S. HOEDEMAKER: Spatial Information and Representations of Word Meaning:  
Accessing Semantic Size during Reading 
(Under the direction of Peter C. Gordon) 
 
Theories of embodied cognition have proposed that language is understood through 
perceptual simulation of the sensorimotor characteristics of its meaning. This claim suggests 
the activation of sensorimotor representations is encoding-based. Participants in three eye-
tracking experiments were presented with triplets of either numbers or object and animal 
names. When the task was to compare the referent size of the items, word and number 
decision times showed a symbolic distance effect, such that response time was inversely 
related to the size difference between the items. When semantic size was irrelevant to the 
task it had no effect on word encoding times. Number encoding times showed a distance 
priming effect: encoding time increased with numerical difference between items. Together 
these results suggest that while activation of numerical magnitude information is both 
encoding-based and goal-driven, size information associated with words is goal-driven and 
does not occur automatically during encoding.  
 
  
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction _          1 
Analog Representations of Meaning in Contemporary Cognitive Psychology 2 
Embodied Activation of Word Meaning       4 
Analog Representations of Magnitude       9 
Current study           12 
Experiment 1           14 
Method           15 
Results and Discussion         21  
Experiment 2           30  
Method           31 
Results and Discussion         32 
Experiment 3           36 
Method           36 
Results           38 
Discussion           47 
General Discussion           50 
Sensorimotor Representations and Action-Oriented Language Comprehension  53 
Future Directions          52 
References            59 
 
 
iv 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Presentation of stimuli and dependent measures in Experiment 1 and 3   20 
Figure 2. Decision and encoding times in Experiment 1     24 
Figure 3. Individuals’ mean middle-last ratio by the slope of the size-based effect on the 
middle word in Experiment 1        28 
Figure 4. Multiple regression of single fixations duration in Experiment 2   34 
Figure 5. Individuals’ mean middle-last ratio by the slope of the size-based effect on the 
  middle word in Experiment 3        42 
Figure 6. Encoding and decision times for words and numbers in Experiment 3  45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
When reading a word, we are able to access different aspects of its meaning. On the 
one hand, we may understand a word that has a concrete referent by virtue of its connection 
to other internal symbols or associations that provide information about categories, semantic 
relations, or linguistic co-occurrence.  On the other hand, we may understand that word’s 
meaning through our experience with its referent’s sensory characteristics such as color, 
shape and size. Recently, the field of embodied cognition has assigned a central role to 
sensorimotor experiences as the source of all conceptual knowledge. It is argued that 
knowledge of concepts emerges from perceptual experience and is mentally represented in 
the very same sensorimotor systems that originated the experiences rather than in an amodal 
semantic faculty (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan & 
Madden, 2005). 
Embodied cognition as a field argues against the view that perception and cognition 
reflect independent systems in the mind (Barsalou, 1999). Instead, it is based on the 
assumption that cognitive processes consist entirely of sensorimotor processes.  Cognition is 
not the manipulation of abstract symbols, but the interaction with analog, modal 
representations. Even in the absence of a direct interaction with the environment, 
sensorimotor functions are recruited to support cognitive activity in the form of a ‘mental 
simulation,’ in order to represent information or support inferences (Wilson, 2002). Within 
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this framework, language comprehension is established through the multimodal mental 
simulation of the situation described in an utterance.  
Analog Perceptual Representation in Contemporary Cognitive Psychology 
In contrasting embodied theories of language comprehension with traditional or 
‘disembodied’ approaches, it is tempting to present the latter as allowing no role whatsoever 
for modality specific representations of meaning. Within traditional approaches of the study 
of cognition, mental representations have sometimes been conceptualized as arbitrary, 
abstract symbols that are inherently amodal (Pylyshyn, 2003). Within this framework, 
language functions as a system that connects external representations, such as words and 
sentences, to internal representations of meaning. Importantly, these internal representations 
are qualitatively distinct from representations in our sensorimotor system (e.g. Fodor, 1985).  
However, several fields within contemporary cognitive psychology have traditionally 
recognized the role of analogue perceptual representations. Baddely (1986) assigned a 
specialized system to visuospatial information within working memory, and long term 
episodic memory is considered to rely crucially on multimodal simulation of previous events 
(Paivio, 1986; Conway, 1990). Within the study of memory and learning, implicit learning 
(Jacoby, 1983) repetition priming (Kirsner et al., 1989) and transfer appropriate processing 
(Morris, Bransford & Franks, 1977) are considered to depend largely on the amount of 
overlap in perceptual circumstances of the learning and testing episode. In addition, mental 
imagery is considered to play an important role in the representation of concepts, as has been 
found in studies of categorization and property verification (Kosslyn, 1980). Within language 
research, spatial representations are considered crucial to the construction of mental models 
(Bower & Morrow, 1990; Bransford, Barclay & Franks, 1972; Glenberg, Meyer & Lindem, 
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1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rinck & Bower, 2004). Research focused on reasoning and 
problem solving has shown we often1 rely on analog visuospatial imagery when confronted 
with problems that involve physical reasoning (Hegarty, 2004; Schwartz & Black, 1999) or 
mental rotation of objects (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). 
This selection of examples demonstrates an established tradition within cognitive 
psychology focusing on the role of analogue representations of meaning. The real difference 
between the embodied and symbolic accounts can be framed in terms of the level of language 
processing at which these representations are considered to play a role. In traditional models 
of language processing, linguistic input progresses through several representational stages of 
increasing complexity.  Word meaning at the lexical level is represented in terms of abstract, 
arbitrary symbols as well as the connections between symbols such as semantic networks, 
feature lists, and schemas. Once the word’s meaning has been accessed at this level, it may 
be introduced into the discourse model (Johnson-Laird, 1983), which represents the discourse 
referents, patterns of coreference and how the referents relate to each other (Kintsch & Van 
Dijk, 1978). Creating an effective discourse model requires representation of logical relations 
among the referents, including but not limited to causal, temporal and spatial relations. The 
reader’s background or world knowledge is also incorporated at this level, allowing for 
elaborative and predictive inference generation (Bower & Morrow, 1990). Therefore, 
representations of the meaning of a text or sentence at the discourse or task level are likely to 
involve at least some analog, modality specific components. 
The embodied approach, however, considers word meaning to consist of analog, 
modality specific sensorimotor representations at all levels of conceptual processing. 
According to Barsalou’s perceptual symbol systems hypothesis (1999), words activate 
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simulators associated with the perceptual properties of their referents, creating a perceptual 
simulation of a text or utterance that preserves the analog properties of what is represented. 
Similarly, the immersed experiencer framework (Zwaan, 2004) describes language 
comprehension as the ‘vicarious experience of the described situation’ (p. 36). This 
simulation of perceptual experience is explicitly theorized to take place at the word and even 
the morpheme level of comprehension.  The vicarious experience is created when words 
activate networks of meaning or ‘functional webs’ that are also activated when the word’s 
referent is experienced perceptually. The simulated experience therefore involves more 
perceptual information than an abstract network of semantic meaning may be able to 
represent at the word level. Importantly, perceptual simulation within the embodied 
framework is not an optional aid to comprehension. Instead, representation of concepts is 
inherently perceptual and comprehension consists of perceptual simulation or immersed 
experience. 
Embodied Activation of Word Meaning 
Demonstrations of activation of sensorimotor properties of word meaning during 
reading and spoken language comprehension provide important empirical support for the 
embodied account of language processing. Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou and McRae (2003) 
found that during comprehension, verbs can activate spatial representations based on the 
spatial properties of the expressed action. Participant responded to visual stimuli presented in 
different areas of the visual field, while listening to sentences containing verbs that typically 
express either horizontal (e.g. push) or vertical motion (e.g. lift). This study found that 
processing of the visual stimuli was inhibited when presented in the area of the visual field 
congruent with the verb’s direction of motion. Similar results were found for subject nouns 
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that canonically refer to objects in the upper (e.g. sky) and lower (e.g. grass) portion of the 
visual field (Bergen Lindsay, Matlock & Narayanan, 2007). In both studies, the spatial 
properties of the sentence were considered not relevant to the visual task, which suggests that 
the observed effects occurred during the online, automatic comprehension process.  
The notion that encoding of linguistic stimuli involves rapid activation of spatial 
information has been explored intensively in a series of picture-sentence mapping studies by 
Zwaan and colleagues on what has been named the ‘appearance-compatibility effect.’ These 
authors found that after reading a sentence about a specific object, participants were faster to 
respond to pictures that matched the object’s shape or orientation as it had been described in 
the sentence. For example, reading ‘the carpenter pounded the nail into the wall’ resulted in 
faster response times for a picture of a nail in a horizontal compared to a vertical position 
(Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Wassenburg & Zwaan, 2010) and after reading about an eagle in 
the sky participants were quicker to respond to a picture of an eagle with its wings spread out 
than one with its wings folded in (Zwaan, Stanfield & Yaxley, 2002). Similarly, knowledge 
of the canonical shape of objects can affect eye-movements within a visual-display during 
visual search tasks, so that upon hearing the word ‘Frisbee,’ a distracter picture of a slice of 
pizza drew more looks than unrelated distractor pictures (Yee, Huffstetler & Thompson-
Schill, 2011).  
Besides visuospatial information, language can also interact with motor processing. 
Glenberg & Kaschak (2002) found that during a sentence plausibility judgment task, 
participants responded more quickly when the action required to respond matched the 
direction of movement described in the sentence. For example, reading the sentence ‘close 
the drawer,’ which implies an action oriented away from the body, participants responded 
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more quickly when the correct response required pushing a button away from the body. This 
finding, coined the ‘action-compatibility effect,’ suggests that language is understood at least 
in part through the activation of a sensorimotor representation of the utterance.  
Together, these studies and many others effectively demonstrate activation of 
visuospatial and motor representations during sentence or word comprehension. 
Nevertheless, they do not provide specific evidence about the level of language processing at 
which this activation takes place while also leaving an unclear picture of the role of task-
goals in relation to these findings. According to the embodied language comprehension 
account, analog symbols extracted from perceptual experience constitute conceptual meaning 
(Barsalou, 1999), and activation of ‘experiential representations’ takes place at the word level 
of language comprehension (Zwaan, 2004).  “Whereas such knowledge is cumbersome and 
brittle in amodal symbol systems…it ‘rides for free’ in perceptual symbol systems” 
(Barsalou, 1999, p. 604, quotations in original). As such, the embodied cognition account 
predicts encoding-based activation during the reading of words, irrespective of higher level 
processes related to context or task-specific goals.  
Critics of the embodied account have countered that demonstrations of sensorimotor 
activation during conceptual processing do not provide evidence that sensorimotor 
representations are constitutive of the concept or even conceptually relevant (Adams, 2010; 
Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Weiskopf, 2010), which would be expected if the activation 
were task-independent and encoding-based.  As argued by Mahon and Caramazza (2008), the 
observed sensorimotor effects may not be related to word meaning accessed during encoding, 
but instead result from activation originating in abstract, disembodied representations 
spreading into systems capable of sensorimotor representation. This cascading activation 
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may result in fast, somatotopic activation of the sensorimotor system upon processing words 
referring to concrete objects or physical action, but this observation does not in itself provide 
evidence that such activation is constitutive of the word’s conceptual representation.  
In support of this argument, Mahon and Caramazza (2008) provide an example from 
speech production studies. Naming latency measurements have shown that when participants 
are asked to name pictures (e.g. a picture of a hammock), phonologically related distractor 
pictures (e.g. a hammer) result in faster target naming times compared to unrelated distractor 
pictures (e.g. a button) (Navarrete and Costa, 2005). These results are taken as evidence that 
even though the participants intend to ignore the distractor picture, its presence results in fast 
automatic activation of phonological information associated with the word ‘hammer.’ 
Similarly, studies of embodied language comprehension may show that seeing a picture of a 
hammer activates motor programs associated with handling tools, or areas of the motor 
cortex involved in actions related to the hand and arm. Within embodied cognition, such 
motor activation upon seeing a hammer is taken as evidence that the concept hammer is 
represented within these sensorimotor systems. However, the automatic online activation of 
phonological aspects of unproduced words is never taken to suggest that the part of the 
conceptual meaning of hammer is represented in the phonological system. As such, the 
analogy clarifies that the observation of motor activation related to handling hammers upon 
seeing one pictured does not provide sufficient evidence that this activation is critically 
related to understanding the concept HAMMER.  
 An embodied cognition rebuttal might of course point out that the phonologically 
related distractor picture results in activation of the label ‘hammer’ rather than the concept 
itself. Observed motor activation related to actually using a hammer is arguably a 
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semantically meaningful component of the concept HAMMER, whereas phonological or 
label-based activation is not. Nevertheless, the example illustrates the need to reconsider the 
idea that observed sensorimotor activation during language processing must be conceptually 
relevant information activated as part of the encoding process. A disembodied account of 
language comprehension can explain appearance- and action-compatibility effects promoted 
as evidence for the embodied account by assuming flow of activation within and between 
cognitive systems, urging a careful consideration of how this activation originates as well as 
what drives its spread into particular sensorimotor and conceptual systems. 
Importantly, the hammer-analogy also draws attention to the importance of task-goals 
during linguistic and semantic processing. Phonological distractor pictures lead to 
phonological activation during word-naming tasks, while sensorimotor activation may be 
observed during semantic categorization. In both cases, the type of information accessed 
facilitates performance on the task at hand. As emphasized by several critics of the embodied 
account, it is likely that goal-driven recruitment of sensorimotor areas facilitates performance 
on conceptual tasks (Mahon & Carammaza, 2008, Weiskopf, 2010). However, this does not 
suffice to claim the information is inherently a part of the conceptual representation 
HAMMER, irrespective of task-specific comprehension goals. In other words, there may be 
circumstances in which an adequate understanding of HAMMER does not require the 
involvement of any sensorimotor components of meaning. Therefore, strong support for the 
embodied cognition claim that language comprehension at the word-meaning level consists 
of analog mental simulation, requires that activation of sensorimotor information relevant to 
the word’s conceptual meaning, is observed during encoding, regardless of task or goal-
related processes. Evidence that would allow for an empirical distinction between embodied 
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mental simulation and ‘disembodied’ flow of activation accounts of observed congruent 
sensorimotor activation during language processing requires tasks that distinguish (task-
independent) encoding-based from (task-related) goal-driven activation of sensorimotor 
representations during language processing. The study of how we encode and compare 
representations of referent magnitude provides the necessary methodological tools to make 
such a distinction.  
Analog representations of magnitude 
 A variety of useful tasks have been developed that provide insight into the processing 
of representations of semantic magnitudes associated with symbols such as words and 
numbers.  Tasks involving comparison of magnitudes have consistently shown the symbolic 
distance effect -- the finding that the time required to determine the larger of two visually 
presented numerals is an inverse function of the difference between the two numerals (Henik 
& Tzelgov, 1982; Koechlin, Naccache, Block & Dehaene, 1999; Moyer & Landauer, 1967; 
Van Opstal, Gevers, De Moor & Verguts, 2008).  For example, choosing the larger number 
of the pair 2 and 8 takes less time than making the same choice for the pair 6 and 8. Reaction 
times depend more strongly on the ratio of the pair of numbers than on their absolute 
difference and in this way resemble a classic psychophysical function. The same effect 
occurs when participants compare lexical stimuli instead of numbers, such that choosing the 
larger or smaller of a pair of animal names is facilitated for pairs with a large difference in 
size (lobster – cow) compared to a small difference in size (sheep – cow). This finding is 
impressively robust (Banks & Flora, 1977; Dean et al., 2005; Holyoak, Dumais & Moyer, 
1979; Moyer & Bayer, 1976) and occurs for a variety of other types of words and dimensions 
(Dean et al., 2005; Holyoak & Walker, 1976; Paivio & Te Linde, 1980; Te Linde & Paivio, 
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1979). The pattern of reaction times is similar to that found for actual perceptual comparisons 
such as choosing the longer of two lines (Johnson, 1939) or the larger of two circles (Moyer 
& Bayer, 1976). Therefore, the symbolic distance effect is generally thought to indicate a 
conversion process of abstract numbers or words into analog representations on the 
dimension of interest, such as numerical magnitude or animal size. The comparison decision 
is then made based on these analog representations, constituting an “internal psychophysical 
judgment” (Moyer, 1973 p.183).   
 While symbolic comparison effects provide insight into the way that we process 
symbolic stimuli, the trial-final reaction times measured in these tasks do not provide direct 
insight into the encoding of symbols because they are influenced by other task-relevant 
processes such as comparison, decision making and response selection. In contrast, distance 
priming tasks are thought to measure the effects of encoding-based activation.  The 
numerical distance priming effect is the finding that responses to a numerical target are faster 
when it is preceded by a number that is close in magnitude than by one that is distant. For 
example, processing the digit 6 is facilitated when preceded by the prime 4 compared to the 
prime 2 (Brysbaert, 1995; Den Heyer & Briand, 1986; Marcel & Forrin, 1974; Reynvoet, 
Brysbaert & Fias 2002). This effect is found both when the prime requires a deliberate 
response and during short SOA masked priming (Koechlin, Naccache, Block, & Dehaene, 
1999); it has been found with verbal numerals (four, six) as well as Arabic numerals and non-
symbolic quantities such as dot patterns (Herrera & Macizo, 2008). In addition, the effect 
occurs even when successful execution of the task does not require activation of the 
number’s magnitude (Brysbaert, 1995; Van Opstal & Verguts, 2011). Importantly, 
comparison to letter stimuli has shown that numerical distance priming relies on activation of 
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magnitude rather than simply order information, since the (alphabetical) order information 
associated with letters leads to comparison distance effects, but not distance priming (Van 
Opstal, Gevers, De Moor & Verguts, 2008). 
 Few studies have explicitly investigated whether analog representations of size 
associated with lexical items that refer to objects also lead to size-based priming effects 
during encoding, and those that do leave us with an unclear picture of the role of task-related 
and goal-driven processes involved in such effects. Schreuder, Flores d’Aracais, and 
Glazenborg  (1984) showed that words were processed more quickly when preceded by a 
word with shared perceptual qualities, such that orange could prime ball. However, Pecher, 
Zeelenberg & Raaijmakers (1998), found that perceptual priming occurred only when the 
perceptual qualities of the stimulus words were first made salient to the participants through a 
perceptual judgment task, pointing towards a task or context dependent activation of 
perceptual properties. However, many of the perceptually related stimulus pairs had different 
sizes (eg. pizza-coin, bracelet-hoop), which may have eliminated perceptual priming. In 
addition, the associative priming effect (studied for comparison) was quite small, raising 
concerns about whether a relatively small perceptual priming effect could be detected in the 
non-salient condition.
 
 
 
 
 
Current Study 
In the symbolic distance effect and numerical distance priming, proximity in the 
semantic magnitude of two stimuli have opposite effects on reaction time, and for this reason 
the two effects are thought to measure different levels of processing. The symbolic distance 
effect, or facilitation of comparison decisions for numbers that are numerically distant, is 
considered to take place at the task or goal-related level of comprehension. At this level, 
symbolic comparison tasks with lexical items robustly show reaction time patterns similar to 
numbers, suggesting that both numerical and lexical symbolic comparison decisions are 
based on analog representations. As with other priming effects, numerical distance priming is 
observed at encoding, thus providing substantial evidence for the analog representation of 
numerical semantic magnitude at the encoding or word-meaning level. This provides the 
opportunity to distinguish between activation at the encoding and goal-driven stages of 
language comprehension based on distinct patterns of reaction time within a single task.  
Brysbaert (1995) created a novel numerical-priming paradigm that is especially well 
suited to the goal of distinguishing encoding-based priming from goal-driven comparison 
effects.  Participants in an eye-tracking experiment were presented with triplets of numbers 
and asked to indicate whether the middle number was numerically in between the two outer 
numbers. In conjunction with eye-tracking, the use of three numbers, rather than the typical 
two, allowed encoding and decision processes to be isolated in a single task. Encoding of the 
middle number takes place before a comparison decision must be made, since all information 
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needed to make a correct decision is available only after the third number has been 
processed. As such, time spent looking at the middle number provided a measure of encoding 
time. A gaze-contingent display technique was used in which the numbers were masked 
except when the participant looked at them during their first-pass reading from left to right.  
This eliminated preview and rereading effects that might have reduced the value of looking 
time as a measure of encoding.  Brysbaert observed a numerical distance priming effect on 
the middle number, such that its encoding time was reduced on trials with a small numerical 
difference between the first and middle number, compared to trials with a larger difference. 
Crucially, the same effect was observed when, instead of judging magnitude-order, 
participants simply encoded each triplet into memory for an immediate recognition task, 
demonstrating encoding-based activation of semantic magnitude associated with numbers 
independent of goal-based activation related to the reader’s task.  The current study extends 
Brysbaert’s distance-priming paradigm to words referring to objects in order to assess 
whether activation of magnitude information about semantic size associated with lexical 
items is encoding- or goal-based.
 
 
 
 
Experiment 1 
 This experiment applied Brysbaert’s (1995) gaze-contingent triplet-comparison task 
to object and animal names.  As illustrated in Figure 1, participants read three words, all 
referring either to objects or animals, and then indicated with a speeded key-press whether 
the size of the referent of the middle word was between the sizes of the referents of the first 
and last word.  The three object or animal names were shown from left-to-right on a screen, 
and a gaze-contingent display technique was used so that each name could only be encoded 
during the eyes’ first-pass over that word.  Triplets of words were constructed so that the 
distance in the semantic size of the second and first items was small, medium or large.  The 
task provides two measures of interest: (1) Decision time is the interval between when the 
eyes first look at the final name in the triplet and the execution of the manual response; it 
includes goal-based activation of task-relevant semantic properties since it covers the time 
during which all information needed to perform the task is available.  (2) Encoding time is 
the gaze duration on the middle word; for numerals in Brysbaert’s study, this measure 
showed distance priming indicating that it reflected encoding-based activation of numerical 
magnitude information 
 To our knowledge, theories of embodied cognition have not previously been applied 
to distance-priming or the symbolic distance effect.  However, these theories have proposed 
that sensorimotor representations are the foundation of the meaning of language and that 
language comprehension involves perceptual simulations of the meaning of what is being 
understood (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg & Robsertson, 2000; Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan & Madden, 
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2005), rather than having sensorimotor representations activated based on task goals as 
critics have contended (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Adams, 2010).  As such, we believe that 
the embodied cognition approach leads naturally to the prediction for this task that distance 
priming should be found for encoding time on the middle object or animal name as Brysbaert 
(1995) found for numerals, because encoding a name should involve creation of a 
representation that captures the perceptual properties of its referent.  In contrast, the goal-
driven activation account suggests that the visuospatial characteristics of a word’s referent 
are not activated automatically during encoding but that instead this information is accessed 
in a goal-driven manner at a later stage of language processing. Therefore, the goal-driven 
activation account does not predict distance priming on encoding time and instead suggests 
that any effects of semantic distance should be understood in terms of how semantic distance 
affects the processes that are invoked by the task goals.  Both the embodied-cognition and 
goal-driven activation approaches lead to the prediction that the decision-time measure 
should show a symbolic distance effect since the difficulty of comparing the size of 
perceptual representations is inversely related to the difference in their sizes (Moyer & 
Bayer, 1976; Banks & Flora, 1977; Holyoak et al., 1979; Dean et al., 2005). 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill participated for course credit.  All were native English speakers with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve about the research goals.   
Stimuli.  Experimental stimuli consisted of triplets of object and animal names 
selected from size-rating norms for animal (Dean et al., 2005) and object names (Holyoak et 
al., 1979).  Objects and animals were selected with two constraints:  (1) Across items there 
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was a substantial range in rated size that was evenly distributed so that equal numbers of 
items could be placed in each of three size groups (small, medium and large), and (2) the 
average standard deviation in size ratings for an item was low, indicating that size 
representations were similar across raters.  Cross-individual consistency in size estimates was 
further validated by examining the reliability of ratings for the 21 animal names that were 
normed in both Dean et al. and Holyoak et al. Although the two studies used different rating 
scales, had different rating instructions, and were collected more than twenty years apart, the 
two sets of norms were highly correlated, r = .956, p < .001, R
2
 = .91. 
 The stimulus triplets were constructed as follows. Twenty-one animal names referring 
to animals across a range of sizes served as targets appearing in the middle position of a 
triplet, while the remaining 25 animal names served as flankers. Triplets were constructed so 
that the semantic size difference between the first and the second animal was small (about 1 
target standard deviation), medium (about 2 target standard deviations) or large (3 or more 
target standard deviations). In addition, the first item was either larger or smaller than the 
target item, so that there were an equal number of ascending and descending triplets, 
resulting in a 3(size difference) x 2(direction of the size difference) within-subjects design. 
The third word in the triplet was added so that for half of the trials, the size of the middle 
animal was in between the size of the two outer animals, resulting in a ‘consistent’ triplet 
(e.g. eagle – cow – elephant). On the other half of the trials, the size of the middle item was 
not in between the two outer items, resulting in an ‘inconsistent’ triplet (e.g. giraffe – cow – 
elephant). The same procedure was followed for the object triplets, using 21 target and 37 
flanker objects.   
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A norming study was conducted to measure the semantic relatedness of all the word 
pairs occurring within the triplets.  Thirty participants were presented with the pairs one at a 
time and asked to rate the association between the items in the pair (“Indicate the degree to 
which you feel these two items are associated. For example, how often do you think of the 
two items together, do they occur together in the real world, or are they mentioned in the 
same context?”), answering on a scale of 1 (not at all associated) to 7 (entirely associated). 
The order of the words in each pair was counterbalanced across participants. None of the 
participants in the norming study took part in any of the eye-tracking experiments reported 
here. Overall, the pairs were rated low on semantic relatedness, with a mean rating of 2.52 
for small difference pairs (SD = .62), 2.48 for medium difference pairs (SD = .62) and 2.18 
for large difference pairs (SD = .53). The slight difference in mean similarity ratings for pairs 
with small and medium size differences was significant by subjects but not by items, t1(29) = 
2.82, p = .009; t2(41) = .32, p = .749.  For pairs with medium and large size differences, the 
difference in similarity ratings was significant, t1(29) = 8.50, p < .001; t2(41) = 2.65, p = .011.  
Previous research on semantic or associative priming suggests that words are processed more 
quickly when preceded by a semantically related or associated prime (Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971). Therefore, if the results of the experiment show reduced reading times 
for pairs within the small or medium size difference condition compared to the large size 
difference condition, it will be important to distinguish between effects caused by the size 
difference manipulation and differences in semantic relatedness.  
 Target items were counterbalanced across six lists, each consisting of six blocks of 42 
trials, resulting in 252 trials per participant. In each block, all target words appeared once in 
random order, with animal and object triplets randomly intermixed. Across the blocks within 
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a list, each word appeared once in each condition, so that all participants saw each target in 
each condition. To control for possible effects of target repetition, each list started with a 
different block. Each experimental session started with twelve warm-up trials, which did not 
contain any of the target words used in the experimental trials. The warm-up trials were 
excluded from all analyses. To make sure participants fully understood the task, they were 
also presented with several practice triplets verbally by the experimenter before they were set 
up for eye-tracking. 
Procedure. Eye movements were recorded from the participants’ right eye using an 
SR EyeLink 1000.  Stimuli were presented on a 20 inch ViewSonic G225f Monitor at a 
distance of 61 cm with a display resolution of 1024 x 768. At the beginning of each session 
the tracker was calibrated using a 9-point procedure; calibration was checked between trials 
and the tracker was recalibrated when necessary.  Participants sat in a well-lit room with a 
chin- and forehead rest minimizing their head movements. They were instructed to read the 
triplets silently and decide for each triplet whether the size of the middle object or animal 
was in between the two outer (first and last) objects or animals. Participants answered by 
indicating ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ using a handheld console. The experimenter monitored eye 
movements throughout the session.  
Each trial started with a fixation point placed on the left side of the screen on the 
horizontal axis. Once this point was fixated, the next screen appeared, with the first word of 
the triplet slightly to the right of the fixation point. The middle and last word appeared in the 
center and on the right side of the screen on the same horizontal axis, masked by hash marks. 
Gaze-contingent invisible boundaries were placed approximately 120 pixels to the left of the 
middle and last word’s mask. Gaze contingencies were set up so that each word was visible 
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only when the eyes entered the word’s region from left to right, and was no longer visible 
after the eyes left its region to the right (see Figure 1). This method of stimulus presentation 
prevented potential parafoveal preview or rereading of the first and middle word. When the 
participants moved their gaze across the invisible boundary between the first and middle 
word, the middle word was unmasked and the first word was masked. The same event was 
repeated when the eyes crossed the invisible boundary between the middle and last word, so 
that the middle word was masked and the third word unmasked. Once the eyes left the first or 
middle word to the right, these items did not become visible again upon regressive eye-
movements. The last word remained visible until a response was made. Participants received 
feedback on their accuracy after every trial.  
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Figure 1. Presentation of stimuli and dependent measures in Experiment 1 and 3. Encoding 
time is measured as the gaze duration on the middle word. Decision time is the time from the 
onset of the last word until the indication of a response by a speeded key-press. A gaze-
contingent display technique was used in which the numbers were masked except when the 
participant looked at them during their first reading pass from left to right.  This eliminated 
preview and rereading of the first and middle number. 
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Analysis of eye movements. Fixations shorter than 80 ms and within 1 degree of a 
longer, immediately subsequent fixation were merged with the longer fixation by an 
automatic procedure in the Eyelink software.  
Data analysis focused on two standard eye-movement measures. Single-fixation 
duration was the average of the duration of the initial, first-pass fixation on a word given that 
the word was fixated on first-pass only once. Gaze duration was the average of the sum of all 
first-pass fixation durations on a word (Rayner, 1998). Following Brysbaert (1995), gaze 
duration on the middle word was taken as a measure of encoding time for this item, reflecting 
encoding-based activation of word properties. In addition to these widely used measures, 
Decision Time was the time from the onset of the third word until the button press indicating 
a response, reflecting goal-based activation. We also computed Middle-Last Ratio, which 
was the gaze duration of the middle word over the decision time. This provided a measure of 
the proportion of time spent on the middle word compared to the time spent on the last word 
and the task-decision on each trial. 
Results and Discussion 
 The detailed data analyses reported below are based on the first three blocks 
performed by each participant.  This is done to allow close comparison to the results of 
Experiment 3, where the addition of another task meant that only three blocks of data could 
be obtained in this part of the experiment.  Analyses of all six blocks in Experiment 1 showed 
very similar patterns of results and all effects of interest remained significant
1
.  Overall 
accuracy was 87%, and no participant had an average accuracy below 71%. Inaccurate trials 
were excluded from all analyses involving response time measures.  
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Mean decision times are shown in the left panel of Figure 2.  They showed a strong 
symbolic distance effect, with times decreasing as the difference in semantic size between the 
first and middle word increased, F1(1,23) = 24.43, p <.001; F2(1,41) = 17.82, p < .001, for 
the linear effect of size difference. There was no difference in decision times between 
ascending and descending trials, F1(1,23) = 3.12, p = .09; F2(1,41) = 2.18, p = .148, though 
there was a marginally significant tendency for the effect of size difference to be stronger for 
descending than ascending trials, F1(1,23) = 4.48, p = .045;  F2(1,41) = 2.57, p = .117.  
Decision times were faster for consistent trials (requiring a ‘yes’ response, M = 2049 ms) 
than for inconsistent trials (requiring a ‘no’ response, M = 2241 ms), F1(1,23) = 10.43, p = 
.004; F2(1,41) = 10.39, p = .003. Consistency did not interact with size difference, F1(1,23) = 
1.14, p = .295; F2(1,41) = .539, p = .467.    
As shown in the right panel of Figure 2, middle word encoding times also showed a 
symbolic distance effect, such that mean encoding time on the middle word was shorter when 
the semantic size difference between the first and middle word was larger, F1(1,23) = 11.73, 
p = .002; F2(1,41) = 6.02, p = .018 for the linear effect of size difference.  Middle word 
encoding time did not show a difference between ascending and descending trials, F1(1,23) = 
.195 p = .674; F2(1,41) = .002, p = .969, nor was there an interaction between size difference 
and direction of the difference, F1(1,23) = .181, p = .674,  F2(1,41) = .919, p = .343.  
Observation of a symbolic distance effect on the middle words shows that the effect 
of size difference on encoding time for words was the opposite of the distance-priming effect 
that Brysbaert (1995) found for numbers.  This pattern does not support encoding-based 
activation of size information, which we have argued leads to the prediction that distance 
priming should be observed for encoding times.  The surprising finding of a symbolic 
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distance effect on encoding times is analyzed below in relation to individual differences in 
strategies for performing the triplet comparison task. 
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Figure 2. Decision and encoding times in Experiment 1. Mean decision times (A) and middle 
word encoding times (B) for trials with small, medium and large differences in semantic size 
between the middle and first item. Both measures show a symbolic distance effect. Gaze 
duration on the middle word and decision time are shorter when the difference in semantic 
size between items is larger. 
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Variation in individual strategies. Our analysis plan followed Brysbaert (1995) in 
operationalizing encoding time as gaze duration on the middle word, an approach that is 
consistent with practice in the reading literature where systematic effects of lexical properties 
on gaze duration have led to its being considered a primary measure of word recognition 
(Rayner, 1998).  The finding that gaze duration on the middle word showed a symbolic 
distance effect indicates that in this task this measure may reflect both lexical encoding and 
goal-driven processing.  This possibility was tested by examining whether the magnitude of a 
participant’s symbolic distance effect on encoding time for the middle word was related to 
his or her judgment strategy.  The magnitude of the symbolic distance effect on encoding 
time was given by the slope of the linear effect of size difference between the first and 
middle words on middle-word gaze duration encoding time.  More negative slopes indicate 
stronger symbolic distance effects, while a slope of zero indicates no distance effect and a 
positive slope would indicate distance priming.  Judgment strategy was given by the a 
participant’s middle-last ratio, defined as the participant’s average encoding time on the 
middle word divided by his or her average decision time.  Mean participant middle-last ratios 
ranged from .12 to .99. High ratios indicate that the participant spent a relatively long time 
encoding the middle word compared to the time spent on the last word until the response 
indicating a decision, a pattern that is consistent with the use of an incremental-judgment 
strategy where the semantic size of the middle word is mentally compared to that of the first 
word before the eyes move on to the final word.  Lower ratios indicate long decision times 
relative to middle word encoding times, a pattern that is consistent with the use of a final-
judgment strategy where mental comparison of sizes is postponed until the last word is seen.   
26 
 
 The scatterplot in Figure 3 shows that the magnitude of a participant’s symbolic 
distance effect on encoding time was strongly related to his or her judgment strategy, with 
larger symbolic distance effects observed for participants pursuing an incremental-judgment 
strategy than for those pursuing a final-judgment strategy.  This conclusion is supported by a 
robust negative correlation between participants’ middle-last ratios and the slopes of their 
size-difference effects, r = -.706, p < .001, R
2 
= .498.  Judgment strategy, as measured by 
middle-last ratio, was not related to overall speed measured by total time for trial completion, 
r = .115 p = .593. However, subject middle-last ratio was related to overall accuracy, with 
use of an incremental strategy showing a positive correlation with mean accuracy in the task, 
r = .487, p = .016, R
2
 = .237. This supports the idea that individual participant strategies not 
only affect the extent to which participants exhibit the symbolic distance effect on the middle 
word, but also their level of task performance.  
 The scatterplot in Figure 3 also provides evidence about whether use of an 
incremental judgment strategy may have caused distance priming for the second word to be 
masked by mental comparison processes that occurred while the participant looked at the 
second word.  If that were the case, then it would be expected that participant’s using a final-
judgment strategy (indicated by a low middle-last ratio) might show distance priming, rather 
than the symbolic distance effect, on middle-word encoding time.  Examination of 
performance for participants using a final-judgment strategy, shown toward the left in Figure 
3, suggests that this was not the case.  The slopes of the size-difference effect for these 
participants appear to be randomly distributed around zero, rather than showing a 
preponderance of positive slopes of the sort that would be associated with distance-priming 
effects.  Statistical support for this conclusion comes from the absence of a significant effect 
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of size difference on encoding time (middle-word gaze duration) for the 50 percent of 
participants with the lowest middle-last ratios (M = .21),  F1(1,11) = 2.652 p = .132; F2(1,41) 
= .839 p = .365 (n = 12). The 50 percent of participants with the highest middle-last ratios 
(M = .56) showed robust symbolic distance effects on encoding time, F1(1,11) = 12.5, p = 
.005; F2(1,41) = 10.6, p = .002, (n = 12). 
This experiment showed robust symbolic distance effects on decision times across 
participants, and on encoding times for those participants using an incremental-judgment 
strategy.  Because the symbolic distance effect reflects difficulty of comparing the size of 
objects that are close in size, these effects support the idea that size information associated 
with lexical items was activated by the goal of size comparison.  The experiment provided no 
evidence of distance priming as would be expected if size information were automatically 
activated during lexical encoding.
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Figure 3. Individuals’ mean middle-last ratio by the slope of the size-based effect on the 
middle word in Experiment 1. There is a strong, negative relationship between the 
individuals’ mean middle-last ratio and mean encoding slope. Individuals with a high 
middle-last ratio (incremental judgment strategy) show a strong symbolic difference effect 
during middle word gaze durations. Individuals with a low middle-last ratio (final judgment 
strategy) show no systematic effect of size difference on middle word gaze durations. 
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1 Results of Experiment 1 with 6 blocks:  Mean accuracy was 88%. Decision times decreased 
as the difference in semantic size between the first and middle word increased: F1(1,23) = 
36.69, p < .001; F2(1,41) = 27,63, p < .001 for the linear effect of size difference. There was 
no difference in decision times between ascending and descending trials: F1(1,23) = 1.54, p = 
.228; F2(1,41) = .916, p = .344 and no interaction between size difference and the direction of 
the difference: F1(1,23) = 2.62, p = .119; F2(1,41) = 3.10, p = .086. Decision times were 
faster for consistent trials (1853 ms) than for inconsistent trials (2050 ms), F1(1,23) = 40.71, 
p < .001; F2(1,41) = 23.49, p < .001 and there was a marginally significant tendency for the 
effect of size difference to be stronger for consistent trials: F1(1,23) = 5.66, p = .026; 
F2(1,41) = 2.85, p = .099. 
Mean encoding times were shorter when the semantic size difference between the first and 
middle word was larger: F1(1,23) = 7.74, p = .011; F2(1,41) = 21.25, p < .001 for the linear 
effect of size difference. There was no difference between ascending and descending trials: 
F1(1,23) = .99, p = .330; F2(1,41) = 1.45, p = .236 and no interaction between size difference 
and direction of the difference: F1(1,23) = 0.15, p = .904; F2(1,41) = .011, p = .918. 
Mean participant middle-last ratios ranged from .11 to 1.05. There was a negative correlation 
between the middle-last ratio and the slopes of their size-difference effects: r = -.665, p < 
.001, R
2
 = .443. middle-last ratio was not related to total trial completion time: r = .106 p = 
.623, but it was related to overall accuracy, with use of an incremental strategy correlating 
positively with accuracy: r = .51, p = .011, R
2
 = .260. The 50 percent of participants with the 
lowest middle-last ratios (M = .25) showed no significant effect of size difference on 
encoding time: F1(1,11) = 1.17, p = .302; F2(1,41) = .636, p = .430 (n = 12). The 50 percent 
of participants with the highest middle-last ratios (M = .63) showed robust symbolic distance 
effects on encoding time, F1(1,11) = 8.72, p = .013; F2(1,41) = 23.16, p < .001, (n = 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 2 
 The results of Experiment 1 did not show a size-based priming effect of the sort that 
would be expected if activation of semantic size occurs during lexical encoding of object and 
animal names in the same way that Brysbaert (1995) showed that it did for numerals.  
However, the results did show comparison-based activation of size information both on 
decision time and on middle-word encoding time, with the analysis of judgment strategy 
suggesting that the absence of distance priming was not due to masking by the symbolic 
distance effect.  The current experiment examines whether distance priming between 
successive object and animal names is found when the task demands do not involve the 
semantic size of the referents.  It uses Brysbaert’s memory paradigm, where participants read 
three words as in Experiment 1 but then had to judge whether a subsequently presented probe 
word was among the preceding triplet.  Brysbaert found numerical distance priming in this 
task even though the magnitude of the numbers was not relevant to performing the task.  This 
provided evidence that the magnitude of numbers is activated automatically upon encoding 
even if magnitude is not relevant to task goals.  Examination of whether size-based priming 
is found for object and animal names in this task provides a further test of whether there is 
encoding-based activation of semantic size that may perhaps have been masked by 
comparison processes in Experiment 1. 
  
31 
 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill participated for course credit.  All were native English speakers with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve about the research goals.  None had participated in 
Experiment 1. 
Stimuli & Procedure. The object and animal names as well as the mode of 
presentation were identical to those used in Experiment 1. However, participants were 
instructed to move their gaze to a mask at the bottom-center of the screen after reading the 
third word in each triplet. Once fixated, the mask revealed a fourth word. On half of the 
trials, the fourth word had been among that trial’s triplet, while on the other half it was new 
(but could have appeared earlier in the experiment on one or more different trials). The 
participants’ task was to indicate whether the probe had been among the triplet or not, 
indicating ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on a hand-held console. The first, middle and last word of the triplet 
appeared as ‘old’ probes equally often. No words of the triplet were visible on the screen 
after the onset of the probe. The probe remained visible until a response was made. 
Participants received accuracy feedback after each trial. 
 After completing the experiment, participants were given a questionnaire with 
increasingly specific questions checking for any awareness of the size difference 
manipulation.  
Analysis of eye movements. Eye movements were analyzed as in Experiment 1. 
Middle-last ratios were not computed since the triplet and the probe were not considered to 
take part in the same task process.  Due to a stimulus error .9% of all trials were excluded. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Detailed results are presented for the first three blocks only as in Experiment 1
2
.  
Overall accuracy across participants was 97%, with no participant scoring below 92% 
accuracy. Inaccurate trials were excluded from all analyses involving fixations on the last 
word or the probe and response time measures.  
Average encoding times for the middle words did not vary significantly between 
triplets with a small (242 ms), medium (247 ms) or large (243 ms) size difference between 
the first and middle words, F1(1,23) < 1; F2(1,41) < 1.  Encoding times also did not vary as a 
function of the direction of the difference (ascending : 245 ms or descending: 244 ms) 
between the first and middle words, F1(1,23) < 1; F2(1,41) <1, nor was there a significant 
interaction between size difference and the direction of the difference, F1(1,23) = 1.64, p = 
.213; --F2(1,41) = 2.67, p  =  .110.   
  The null effect of size difference on middle-word encoding time was found for a 
measure that was used by Brysbaert (1995) to show distance priming with numbers and 
which has been widely used as a measure of lexical access in studies of reading (Rayner, 
1998).  In order to show that reading time on the middle word was a sensitive measure of 
lexical encoding in this experiment, we investigated its relation to word length (number of 
letters) and word frequency (SUBTLEXus, Brysbaert & New, 2009), factors that are strongly 
related to ease of lexical encoding (Rayner, 1998).   Multiple-regression analyses showed 
that on the middle-word, single-fixation duration was strongly related to word length and 
frequency, r = .729, R
2
= .532, F(2,39) = 22.15, p < .001 (see Figure 4); word length 
significantly predicted single fixation duration, ß = .42, p < .01, as did the log of word 
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frequency within the 51 million word SUBTLEXus corpus, ß = -.396, p < .01.   Neither word 
length nor word frequency interacted with size difference. 
In sum, this experiment showed that while reading time on the middle word was 
related to ease of lexical encoding, it provided no evidence of distance priming as would be 
expected if there were encoding-based activation of semantic size for object and animal 
names, as has been found for numerals (Brysbaert, 1995).  
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Figure 4. Multiple regression of single fixations duration in Experiment 2, using word 
frequency (SUBTLEXus, Brysbaert & New, 2009) and word length as predictors. Both word 
frequency and length are known as robust predictors of encoding time of written words 
(Rayner, 1998). 
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2 Results of Experiment 2 with all 6 blocks:  Accuracy across participants was 97% with no 
participant scoring below 92% accuracy. Encoding times for the middle words did not vary 
significantly between triplets with a small (244 ms), medium (247 ms) and large (245 ms) 
size difference between the first and middle word. F1(1,23) = .336, p = .568; F2(1,41) = .214, 
p  =  .646.  Encoding times also did not vary as a function of the direction of the difference 
(ascending : 246 ms or descending: 245 ms) between the first and middle words, F1(1,23) = 
.261, p = .614; F2(1,41) = .96, p  =  .759, nor was there a significant interaction between size 
difference and the direction of the difference, F1(1,23) = .015, p = .904; F2(1,41) = .006, p  =  
.938. Multiple regression showed that middle-word, single-fixation duration was strongly 
related to word length and frequency, r = .771, R
2 
= .60, F(2,39) = 28.64, p < .001; word 
length significantly predicted single fixation duration, ß = .535, p  < .001, as did the log of 
word frequency per million, ß = -.326, p = .013.  Neither word length nor word frequency 
interacted with size difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 3 
 Neither Experiment 1 nor Experiment 2 provided any evidence of distance priming in 
the processing of animal and object names, though Experiment 1 showed very robust 
symbolic distance effects for these words.  This pattern supports the conclusion that 
representations of semantic size are not automatically activated as part of encoding these 
items but that activation follows instead from the processes required to achieve task goals.  In 
contrast, research on numerals has consistently shown distance priming (Brysbaert, 1995; 
Den Heyer & Briand, 1986; Marcel & Forrin, 1974; Reynvoet et al., 2002) and symbolic 
distance effects (Brysbaert, 1995; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Koechlin et al., 1999; Moyer & 
Landauer, 1967; Van Opstal et al., 2008), a pattern indicating that representations of 
semantic size for numerals are automatically activated during encoding and that the use of 
those representations is influenced by task goals.  In Experiment 3 the size-order judgment 
task of Experiment 1 (Brysbaert, 1995, Experiment 1) is used with both word and number 
trials in order to determine whether this difference in how semantic size is activated for 
words and numerals can be demonstrated in the same experiment. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill participated for course credit.  All were native English speakers with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve about the research goals.  None had participated in 
Experiment 1 or 2. 
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Stimuli. The animal and object triplets were identical to those in Experiment 1. 
However, to allow for the addition of the number block while keeping the testing session 
under forty-five minutes each participant was presented with each target three times, once in 
each size condition, rather than six times as in Experiment 1. Thus, a participant saw each 
item-by-size combination either in an ascending or a descending triplet, but not in both. This 
resulted in a total of 126 animal and object trials per participant.  This is equivalent to the 
first 3 blocks of data which were reported for Experiment 1.  The trials were presented in 
random order. 
 The number triplets were constructed by having each number between 14 and 97 
presented as a target (middle) number once, resulting in 76 trials per participant. The first and 
last numbers were selected so that the numerical difference between the target and the 
flankers was between 1 and 19. The direction of the difference between the first and middle 
number was either ascending or descending, and the third number was chosen so that the 
triplet was either consistent (e.g. 24 – 26 – 31) or inconsistent (e.g. 28 – 26 – 31), 
counterbalanced across four lists. Each list contained each target number once, with 
consistent/inconsistent and ascending/descending trials appearing equally often. Similarly, 
each numerical difference between 1 and 19 appeared approximately equally often per list. 
Each subject saw one list, preceded by eight warm-up trials which were excluded from all 
analyses. The number trials were presented in a separate block from the word trials and the 
order of the word- and number block was counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure. The stimulus presentation and eye-tracking procedures were the same as 
in Experiment 1 with one exception.  Whereas in Experiment 1 the first word of the triplet 
appeared in place of the fixation point, in Experiment 3 the fixation point and the three words 
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were each placed on a separate vertical quarter of the screen. This allowed for more reliable 
measurement of the reading time on the first word, as the appearance of all three words in the 
triplet was triggered in the same way. A gaze-contingent invisible boundary was placed to 
the right of the fixation point and 80 pixels from the left boundary of the first word. Once the 
fixation point was fixated and the trial started, all three words appeared to the right of the 
fixation point masked by hash marks, with 240 pixels between the left boundaries of the 
masks. Gaze-contingent invisible boundaries were placed 80 pixels from the left boundary of 
each mask in the triplet, preventing preview and rereading of any of the words before 
entering and after exiting the word’s region. 
 As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to indicate whether the size of the middle 
animal or object was in between the size of the two outer items. For the number trials, the 
task was to indicate whether the middle number was in between the two outer numbers. All 
responses were made by pressing ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on a hand-held console. 
 There was a short break between the number and word blocks, and the eye tracker 
was recalibrated for all participants between the two blocks.  
Analysis of eye movements. Eye movements were analyzed as in Experiment 1.  
Results  
Two participants whose accuracy score was below 57% on either portion of the 
experiment were excluded from both sets of analyses and replaced. Comparing accuracy and 
total trial time for the number and object-animal portion of the experiment indicates that the 
task was easier to perform with numbers than with object and animal names. Overall 
accuracy was higher for the number (93%) than for the word portion of the experiment 
(89%): F(1,23) = 12.04, p = .002, and mean total trial time was faster for the numbers (M = 
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2348 ms) than the object-animal names (M = 3590 ms): F(1,23) = 58.0, p < .001.  For both 
the word and number tasks, inaccurate trials were excluded from all reading time analyses 
involving response time measures.  Reading time results for the word and number blocks are 
discussed separately below. 
Object and animal names. Mean decision times are shown in the top, left panel of 
Figure 5.  As in Experiment 1, they showed a strong symbolic distance effect, with times 
decreasing as the difference in semantic size between the first and middle word increased, 
F1(1,23) = 31.10, p < .001; F2(1,41) = 25.52, p < .001.  There was no significant difference 
in decision times between ascending  and descending trials, F1(1,23) = 3.87, p = .061; 
F2(1,41) = 3.40 p = .072 , though there was a tendency for the effect of size difference to be 
stronger for descending than ascending trials: F1(1,23) = 8.106, p = .009; F2(1,41) = 5.00, p  
= .031.  Decision times were faster for consistent than inconsistent trials, F1(1,23) = 9.91, p = 
.005; F2(1,41) = 14.07, p  = .001, but the interaction between consistency and size difference 
was not significant, F1(1,23) = 1.127, p = .299; F2(1,41) = .850, p  = .362.  
 As shown in the top-right panel of Figure 6, encoding time on the middle word also 
showed a symbolic distance effect, such that mean gaze durations on the middle word 
decreased as the difference between the middle and first word increased, F1(1,23) = 9.51, p = 
.005; F2(1,41) = 7.39, p  =  .01.  Middle-word encoding time did not differ significantly for 
ascending and descending trials, F1(1,23) = .37, p = .850; F2(1,41) = .107, p  =  .745, nor was 
there an interaction between size difference and direction of the difference, F1(1,23) = .063; p 
= .804, F2(1,41) = .352, p  =  .556. 
These results for the word portion of Experiment 3 replicate Experiment 1 on all 
measures of interest. 
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Variation in individual strategies for animal and object names. Analysis of variation 
in participants’ task strategies was assessed as in Experiment 1 by examining the relationship 
between middle-last ratio and symbolic distance effect slopes on encoding time.  Individuals’ 
mean middle-last ratios ranged from .12 to .93.  Figure 5 shows that there was a strong 
negative correlation between participants’ middle-last ratio and the slopes of their size-
distance effects, r = -.654, p = .001, R
2 
= .43, just as there was in Experiment 1.  Individuals 
with higher ratios showed more negative encoding time slopes, indicating a stronger effect of 
size difference.  Consistent with Experiment 1, judgment strategy, as measured by middle-
last ratio, was not related to overall speed as measured by total time for trial completion, r = -
.108, p = .616.  In contrast to Experiment 1, where higher middle-last ratios were 
significantly related to overall accuracy, this relationship was not significant in Experiment 2, 
r = .325, p = .122.  However, the results of one participant were very different from the 
general pattern, as this person had both the lowest decision ratio (.12) and the highest 
accuracy rate (1.0).  When this outlier was removed there was a significant correlation 
between middle-last ratio and accuracy that was numerically similar to the one found in 
Experiment 1, r = .490, p = .018, R
2
 = .240.  Removal of this participant’s data caused little 
change in the critical relationship between encoding time slope and middle-last ratio, r = -
.642, p = .001, R
2
 = .412. 
As in Experiment 1, the 50% of participants with the lowest middle-last ratios (mean 
= .27) did not show a significant effect of size difference on encoding time, F1(1,11) = .129, 
p = .726; F2(1,41) = .034 p = .855, while the 50% of participants with the highest middle-last 
ratios (M = .63) showed a significant effect on this measure, F1(1,11) = 14.22, p = .003; 
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F2(1,41) = 7.148 p = .011. These results on strategy effects for the word portion of 
Experiment 3 replicate those from Experiment 1 on all measures of interest. 
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Figure 5. Individuals’ mean middle-last ratio by the slope of the size-based effect on the 
middle word in Experiment 3. These results show the same pattern as Experiment 1. There is 
a strong, negative relationship between the individuals’ mean middle-last ratio and mean 
encoding slope. Individuals with a high middle-last ratio (incremental judgment strategy) 
show a strong symbolic difference effect during middle word gaze durations. Individuals 
with a low middle-last ratio (final judgment strategy) show no systematic effect of size 
difference on middle word gaze durations. 
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Numbers. Whereas the design of the object-animal names study used three categories 
of size difference (small, medium, large), the difference in size for the numbers varied 
continuously from one to nineteen.  Accordingly, the effects of size difference were analyzed 
using regression rather than ANOVA, with times regressed on the log of size difference 
because of evidence that the mental number line is logarithmic (Shepard, Kilpatric & 
Cunningham, 1975; Dehaene, 2003).   Trials on which the first and last number were 
identical (6.2% of the trials) were excluded from all analyses involving decision time and 
accuracy measures as were trials where decision times were more than three standard 
deviations above the grand mean (2.4% of correct trials).   
As seen in the bottom-left panel of Figure 6, average decision times decreased with 
the log of the difference between the middle and final numerals, r = .880 R
2
= .774,  F(1,17) = 
58.13, p < .001.  The generality across participants of this symbolic distance effect on 
decision times was further assessed by fitting the regression model to each participant’s data 
individually.  The slope parameters calculated this way were significantly less than zero (M = 
-51.1), t(23) = -3.1, p = .005. Decision times were faster for consistent triplets (1051 ms) than 
inconsistent triplets (1196 ms), F(1,23) = 20.46, p < .001 and the effect of size difference on 
decision time was greater for consistent sequences than for inconsistent sequences, t(23) = 
4.6, p < .001.  
As seen in the bottom-right panel of Figure 6, average encoding times for the middle 
number increased with the log of the difference between the first and middle numerals, r = 
.63, R
2
 = .40, F(1,17) = 11.35, p = .004. The generality across participants of this distance 
priming effect on encoding times was significant in a test of the slope parameters obtained 
from fitting the regression model to participants data individually, (M = 39.3), t(23) = 2.44, p 
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= .023. Encoding times were slightly faster for ascending  (565 ms)  faster than descending 
(605 ms), F(1,23) = 5.5, p < .05, but the direction of the difference did not interact with size 
difference: t(23) = -1.95 p = .064. 
 These results support both encoding- and goal-based activation of numerical 
magnitude. At the number-meaning level of comprehension, encoding-based activation 
results in a numerical distance priming effect on encoding times. At the task-level of 
comprehension, goal-based activation of numerical magnitude results in a symbolic distance 
effect on the comparison decision times. 
  
45 
 
Figure 6. Encoding  and decision times for words and numbers in Experiment 3. The 
decision times (A) and middle word encoding times (B) for the words both show a symbolic 
distance effect. Decision as well as encoding times are shorter when the difference in 
semantic size between the middle and first item is larger. The number decision times (C) 
follow this pattern as well. Decision time decreases as the log difference between the last and 
middle number increases. The encoding times of the middle number (D) show the opposite 
pattern in the form of a numerical distance priming effect. Middle number encoding times 
increase as the numerical difference between the middle and first number increases. 
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Variation in individual strategies for numbers. Individual participant strategies were 
assessed the same as in Experiment 1 and the word portion of Experiment 3, using middle-
last ratios computed by taking the encoding time on the middle word over the decision time. 
Participants’ mean middle-last ratios on the number portion ranged from .20 to 1.10. In 
addition, the strength of the numerical distance priming effect for each individual was 
calculated by taking the slope of encoding time as a function of the numerical distance 
between the middle and first number, so that more positive slopes indicated stronger priming 
effects. Whereas individual strategies were related to the strength of the symbolic distance 
effect on encoding times for the object and animal names, individual participant strategies 
did not uniformly affect the strength of the numerical distance priming effect as there was no 
relationship between the subject’s mean middle-last ratio and their encoding time slope: r = 
.264, p = .213.  
 Judgment strategy, as measured by middle-last ratio, was related to overall speed, 
with use of an incremental judgment strategy showing a positive correlation with average 
time needed to complete each trial: r = .602 p = .002, R
2
 = .362. This is in contrast with 
results on object and animal names in Experiment 1 and the word portion of Experiment 3, 
where decision ratio was not related to overall speed. This suggests that individuals with an 
incremental judgment strategy for the numbers generally processed numerical stimuli more 
slowly than individuals with a final judgment strategy. 
  Middle-last ratio was not related to accuracy: r = .228, p = .283. Again, this result is 
in contrast with Experiment 1 and the word portion of Experiment 3 once we removed one 
participant outlier, in which higher middle-last ratios were related to better task performance.  
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 support our earlier results showing that representations of 
the size of objects and animals are not automatically activated during lexical encoding of 
their names, but rather that size information is activated for the comparison processes 
necessary to achieve task goals.  Further, the results show that this pattern contrasts with that 
found for numerals, where representations of semantic size are automatically activated during 
encoding and where the use of those representations is influenced by task goals.  These 
conclusions are supported by the finding that object and animal names do not show a 
distance priming effect but do show a symbolic distance effect, while numerals show 
distance priming early in processing and a symbolic distance effect later in processing as 
previously demonstrated by Brysbaert (1995).   
Analyses of individual differences in task strategies provide further evidence that 
semantic size is activated in different ways for object-animal names and for numerals.  The 
two types of stimuli lead to similar variation in middle-last ratio, a measure of the time spent 
on the middle word or number relative to the time spent on making the decision after seeing 
the final word or number.  However, the characteristics of performance associated with this 
variation in task strategies differ for the two types of stimuli.  For object and animal names, a 
high middle-last ratio was associated with showing a symbolic distance effect on encoding 
time for the middle word, with higher accuracy and with no increase in overall trial time.  
This suggests that participants showing high middle-last ratios made use of an incremental-
judgment strategy that involved comparing the semantic size of the middle and first items 
before encoding and comparing the final item.  This strategy is efficient in that it increased 
accuracy without increasing overall time to complete the trial.  For numerals, variation in 
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middle-last ratio was not related to the magnitude of distance priming during encoding of the 
middle number, nor was it related to performance accuracy.  However, high middle-last 
ratios were associated with slower trial times. 
Differences in the meanings associated with animal-object names and numerals 
suggest a reason why there are differences in the use of semantic size information for these 
two types of symbols.  Many different types of semantic properties are associated with object 
and animal names.  Automatically activating all of those meanings upon encoding a word 
may be impossible or inefficient.  Accordingly, semantic size information is only activated 
by processes that are specifically related to task goals, in this case comparison of the size of 
successive items.  Use of an incremental-judgment strategy is efficient because activation of 
the size information is difficult, making it problematic to engage in a final-judgment strategy 
where activation and comparison of size information is postponed until all three items have 
been encoded.  In contrast, because little meaning beyond semantic size is inherently 
associated with numerals, semantic size information may be automatically activated upon 
encoding.  Such easy, automatic activation eliminates any processing advantage of an 
incremental-judgment strategy relative to a final-judgment strategy where the activated size 
representations for the three items can be evaluated with respect to the task demand of 
determining whether the middle number is in between the outer ones.  For this reason greater 
time spent looking at the middle item is not efficient and is associated with longer overall 
trial times. 
Comparison of overall performance in the numeral and animal-object tasks provides 
further support for the notion that activation of size information is much easier for numerals 
than for animals and objects.   As noted above, average completion times and error rates were 
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substantially lower for numeral stimuli than for animal and object stimuli (2348 ms vs. 3590 
ms, and 7% vs. 11%).  It seems that semantic size information rides for free with numerals 
but not with words referring to concrete objects.
 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
 The three experiments reported here examined the way in which semantic size is 
activated and used to make judgments.  It did so by measuring looking times and decision 
times as participants made judgments about three symbols (words or numbers) displayed on a 
screen.  A gaze-contingent display technique was used so that participants only received 
visual information about each of the symbols during first-pass fixations on the region of the 
screen containing the symbol.  This technique tightens the association between looking time 
and encoding time by preventing parafoveal preview and rereading (Brysbaert, 1995).  
Experiment 1 showed that decision times in a three-item, size-order judgment task increased 
as the distance in the semantic size of the referents of successive animal or object names 
decreased.  This symbolic distance effect was also observed on encoding time for participants 
who adopted an incremental-judgment strategy of comparing the size of the first two items 
before proceeding to encoding of the third item.  This pattern indicates that semantic size of 
the referent was activated in a goal-driven manner by the mental processes for comparing the 
size of the referents.  Experiment 1 provided no evidence of distance priming (reduction of 
encoding time when the preceding referent was close in size); an effect that would have 
indicated that semantic size was activated automatically during encoding.  Experiment 2 used 
a memory-probe task rather than an order-judgment task but also found no evidence of 
distance priming within the three-item sequences.  If the task goal of size comparison had 
masked distance priming due to encoding-based activation in Experiment 1, then the absence 
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of any size-related task goal should have unmasked the distance-priming effect.  Experiment 
3 replicated the pattern seen in Experiment 1 for animal and object names, indicating goal-
driven activation of size representations but no automatic activation of size representations 
during lexical encoding.  In addition, it showed that size representations were activated both 
in a goal-driven manner and automatically during encoding when the items in the sequence 
were numerals rather than words referring to concrete objects.  This contrast between words 
and numerals suggests that size information is automatically activated during encoding when 
size is the dominant if not sole meaning of a symbol but that it is not automatically activated 
upon encoding of symbols, such as words, that have many associated meanings. 
 The pattern of results in these experiments is not consistent with predictions derived 
from accounts of language comprehension as an embodied process that is fundamentally 
based on perceptual simulation.  Models of this sort, such as perceptual symbol systems 
(Barsalou, 1999) or the immersed experiencer framework (Zwaan, 2004), propose that 
language comprehension entails reactivation of the information associated with the 
perceptual experience of the word’s referent.  If reactivation of perceptual experience is a 
necessary part of language comprehension, then distance-priming should have been observed 
for the encoding of words as it was for the encoding of numbers.  However, our results 
suggest that words are encoded without such perceptual reactivation and that semantic size 
representations are activated in a goal-driven manner by processes necessary for successful 
task performance.   
 Of course it is possible to counter that encoding a word leads to reactivation of some 
of the perceptual properties of its referent but that priming was not observed for semantic 
size because it was not a sufficiently important or salient property of the object or animal 
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names.  Priming might have been observed for other perceptual dimensions, such as color or 
texture, that are more salient than size in general or are particularly salient for a subset of the 
animals and objects.  While this line of reasoning cannot be discounted completely, we 
believe that it is not compelling.  For the objects and animals that we studied, semantic size is 
a very stable property of meaning, as demonstrated by the consistency of participants’ size 
ratings across studies (Dean et al., 2005; Holyoak et al., 1979).  Further, abundant 
demonstrations of the symbolic distance effect (Banks & Flora, 1977; Dean et al., 2005; 
Holyoak, et al., 1979; Moyer & Bayer, 1976) show that size comparisons for these words are 
made using the same kind of analog representations that are used for numbers (Henik & 
Tzelgov, 1982; Koechlin et al., 1999; Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Van Opstal et al., 2008) and 
for actual perceptual stimuli (Johnson, 1939; Moyer & Bayer, 1976).  The symbolic distance 
effect has long been used to demonstrate an “internal psychophysics” (Moyer, 1973 p.183) 
where the relative size of the referents is processed using representations that are akin to 
perceptual representations.  Accordingly, the characteristics of semantic size make it an 
excellent property in which to look for reactivation of perceptual experience as a result of 
encoding words.   
It is also possible to counter that people create simulations rich enough to extract the 
relevant aspects of the meaning of words without expending more cognitive effort than 
strictly necessary (Gibbs & Perlman, 2010), and that therefore activation of perceptual 
properties is selective.  This view readily accounts for the absence of distance priming in 
Experiment 2, where the memory task made semantic size irrelevant, though it is less clear 
how it would account for the results of Experiments 1 and 3, which explicitly required use of 
semantic size.  An optimal simulation of the word meanings for this task certainly involves 
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size information, yet there is no evidence of such a simulation during encoding. This suggests 
that the activation of analog, modal representations is not what constitutes language 
comprehension, or at least not exclusively. Moreover, the idea that perceptual information is 
an optional, goal-directed aspect of language meaning makes it difficult to contrast the 
embodied approach to language comprehension with other approaches in a way that is 
problematic for either.  
Our goal-driven activation model proposes that, during encoding, comprehension 
may rely on activation of abstract, propositional or perceptually underspecified 
representations of word meaning, which in turn allow for activation of context- or task-
relevant aspects of the word’s referent. As such, the goal-driven activation model can 
account for findings of perceptual information affecting language comprehension processes 
in a ‘disembodied’ system, by assuming flow of activation between perceptual and non-
perceptual systems according to goals associated with comprehension and task performance.  
Sensorimotor Representations and Action-Oriented Language Comprehension 
Not withstanding these conclusions, the growing body of research on embodied 
language processing has provided ample evidence that sensorimotor processes play a role 
during language comprehension. Although the current study adds additional weight to the 
argument that these findings to not support the conclusion that sensorimotor simulation is 
constitutive of comprehension, this type of information undeniably supports and enhances 
our understanding of linguistic input, specifically within the framework of task-oriented 
behavior. Therefore, any comprehensive model of language processing needs to incorporate a 
role for analogue, modality specific representations. As discussed in the introduction, 
sensorimotor representations have traditionally received ample attention in the study of 
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processes related to (language-based) reasoning and problem solving. In addition, several 
models of comprehension explicitly include a role for both abstract and sensorimotor 
representations of meaning, ranging from Paivio’s dual-coding theory (1986) to more recent 
developments such as Mahon & Caramazza’s (2008) ‘grounding by interaction’ approach, 
Dove’s (2009) representational pluralism, and the goal-driven activation model presented in 
this paper. In all of these, sensorimotor representations are considered crucial to building 
rich, contextually relevant representations of linguistic meaning that also incorporate the 
reader’s background knowledge and task-goals, recognizing the importance of fast and 
abundant cross-talk between the conceptual and modal system. Unlike the embodied account, 
however, these models do not altogether reject the idea of an abstract, symbolic system 
performing a key role in the representation of meaning.  
Regardless of the important role mental simulation of perceptual information may 
play during every day language use, the lack of an automatic connection between words as 
abstract symbols and sensorimotor representations may be exactly what allows our linguistic 
system to be such a powerful representational tool.  As noted earlier, words referring to 
concrete objects are part of a rich semantic space, which can include category information, 
semantic associates and linguistic co-occurrence information as well as a multifaceted 
perceptual representation. As such these models much more readily account for the current 
findings, as well as several other key observations in the study of language comprehension, 
including our ability to flexibly access different aspects of word’s meaning depending on the 
(task) context (Barclay et al., 1974)  and our ability to represent abstract concepts. 
 Weiskopf (2010) argues that the different interpretations of the role perceptual 
information plays or should play during language comprehension as proposed by embodied 
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and disembodied accounts of language comprehension is based in a fundamental 
disagreement about what language comprehension essentially is, and what it is for. On the 
traditional assumption that cognition is first and foremost a symbol processing system, 
integration with perceptual processing is by no means essential to its operation. 
Understanding of the propositional content or truth conditions of an utterance can be 
achieved through manipulation of abstract symbols, which are divorced from bodily 
experience. Embodied accounts of cognition, however, are based on the idea that the function 
of cognition is to guide actions in the environment in real time (Clark, 1997, Wilson, 2002). 
To allow for efficient interaction with our environment, perceptual information is essential to 
cognitive processing: the more closely integrated perceptual and motor processes are with 
other cognitive processes, including language, the more efficiently a cognitive organism will 
operate in the real world. 
 For example, Glenberg and Robertson (2000) argue that non-afforded sentence such 
as ‘Adam used a ham sandwich to chisel the ice of his windshield’ are difficult to understand 
because it is difficult to represent the described situation based on the affordances of the 
objects in the sentences. Indeed, they found that these sentences are rated low in sensibility 
and more difficult to envision. However, Weiskopf (2010) points out that such difficulty to 
construct a simulated perceptual experience does not inhibit linguistic understanding in a 
more minimal sense. We are still able to assess the truth conditions or propositional content 
of the sentence: Adam used something to chisel ice of his windshield, and the object he used 
was a ham sandwich. Thus, it is possible to understand the syntactic and semantic features of 
the sentence without being able to readily simulate the situation. However, in order to apply 
cognitive processes towards successful operation in the environment, the system needs the 
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type of interface provided by perceptual and motor processing. For example, in order to 
assess whether chiseling ice off your windshield with ham sandwich is plausible, or to make 
inferences about the described situation (e.g. ‘maybe the ham sandwich was frozen as well’), 
a sensorimotor simulation based on (perceptual) background knowledge about the object’s 
affordances will be an effective cognitive tool. Therefore, ability to access perceptual 
properties, or whether something is easy or difficult to simulate perceptually, does not affect 
our understanding of the truth conditions or propositional content of an utterance (Weiskopf, 
2010). However, other comprehension goals, which may be as simple as an implicit 
plausibility check, often rely on the goal-driven activation of perceptual properties for 
efficient task performance. Similarly, a person with aphasia may be able to name a picture of 
a hammer, but unable to demonstrate how to use it. Depending on one’s adopted theory of 
what language is for, it may be argued that this person does or does not ‘understand’ the 
meaning of HAMMER (Caramazza & Mahon, 2006). In other words, the importance of 
sensorimotor representations during comprehension of language depends on how much 
importance is granted to the ability to perform actions in the environment. 
Future directions  
 Instead of presenting the current debate on the nature of language comprehension as a 
choice between two representational systems, one abstract and one perceptual, focusing on 
the functional role of either aspect of meaning may prove to be a more fruitful approach. 
Acknowledging that symbolic and perceptual representations of meaning need not be 
mutually exclusive, such an approach would be able to further explore the ways in which 
abstract and sensorimotor information contribute to comprehension in a complementary way. 
According to models integrating both types of representation, both symbolic and perceptual 
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components of a word’s complex meaning space can be activated flexibly, based on the 
reader’s specific context or task-related goals. While comprehension in the current study 
explicitly required the assessment of a spatial property, the goals that guide comprehension 
during everyday language use are usually implicit. The demands of comprehension or 
conversation may imply some of these goals, while others may be aimed at guiding action in 
the environment in real time, as discussed by proponents of embodied cognition (Wilson, 
2002). Future studies may manipulate reader goals by varying the explicit and implicit 
demands of the task, or by presenting words in a sentential context that makes the properties 
in a specific modality more or less salient. Such research will allow will for further 
distinction between those comprehension processes that can be performed based exclusively 
on the abstract information that is retrieved during of encoding-based activation, and those 
task-related processes that require goal-based activation of the sensorimotor aspects of word 
meaning. Although there is no evidence that motor activation is constitutive of concepts, 
there may be some cognitive operations that are extremely difficult to perform without 
recruiting at least some sensorimotor processes, mental comparison of referent size being just 
one example, while others depend mainly on abstract aspects of meaning. 
 Close integration of perceptual and motor processes with other cognitive activity, 
including language processing, increases the efficiency of action in the environment, 
suggesting a substantial flow of goal-directed activation between linguistic, perceptual and 
motor processes. A goal-based approach to characterizing the nature of linguistic processing 
will provide a way of reconciling embodied and disembodied accounts of comprehension, 
opening the door towards a detailed understanding of how the comprehension system recruits 
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both abstract and modal representations of word meaning in order to optimize cognitive 
performance. 
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